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 Abstract 
The Anglo-American military relationship is a vital yet neglected area of study. This 
article argues that the British military have actively cultivated a relationship with the 
U.S. military that has contributed to the longevity of the broader so-called "Special 
Relationship", even in the Trump era. The article contends that the complexities of 
the military relationship can best be captured by the theoretical lens provided by 
Lowndes and Roberts that combines different strands of institutionalism to focus on 
rules, practices, and narratives. The intense linkages between the United States and 
United Kingdom have become routinized, enabling them to adapt their peacetime 
cooperation to conflicts, and thereby address post-Cold War security challenges. The 
article draws upon semi-structured interviews with senior British military officers as 
well as policy documents to explore how these patterns of collaboration have become 
ingrained in patterns of both thinking and behavior.   
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Analysts are often scornful when the subject of the "Special Relationship" between 
the United States and the United Kingdom is raised, with one recent commentator 
describing the language as "vacuous" (Mumford, 2017, p. 1). Many see it as the 
attempt by a diminishing European power to preserve the past historical cooperation 
that existed with the United States against the Soviet Union. In the words of Dumbrell 
(2001), "there is no question that the Cold War’s end removed much of the rationale 
for intimate and 'special' U.S.-UK cooperation" (p. 2). According to such a view, new 
political realities since that time should have consigned the epithet to history. In the 
contemporary era of President Trump and Brexit it would appear to have little 
relevance. Yet the puzzle of the “Special Relationship” is that, thirty years after the 
end of the Cold War, the discourse remains very much in evidence. It has survived 
between two actors of very different military sizes and strengths, amidst a period of 
enormous geo-political changes. In the words of Prime Minister Theresa May (2018), 
the Anglo-American military relationship remains "the broadest, deepest and most 
advanced security co-operation of any two countries," whilst former Defence 
Secretary, Michael Fallon (2017), noted that "we are now more integrated (with the 
US) at every level."  
 
The UK military has made it a central objective to cultivate an interoperable 
relationship with a country that possesses the most powerful and technologically 
advanced fighting force in the world (UK National Security Strategy and Strategic 
Defence and Security Review, 2015, p. 21). This article contends that the 
conventional military relationship has helped to serve as part of the glue between the 
two countries, at the heart of their broader "political and ideological superstructure" 
of cooperation (Wallace & Philips, 2009, p. 263). During peacetime the military 
relationship is a key element of the dialogue between their security and intelligence 
services, sustaining their defense industrial collaboration and ensuring that they view 
the world through a similar prism. During conflict, the military relationship results in 
the United Kingdom standing alongside the United States from the outset, 
legitimizing its efforts to assemble coalitions. 
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This close military linkage has adapted since the time of the Cold War in the face of 
new security challenges. The multitude of conflicts since 1989 in the Balkans, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria, as well as the new types of tasks–such as peace 
enforcement, counterinsurgency, and post-conflict stabilization–has preserved its 
relevance. Although the United States maintains close connections with a number of 
key allies, including Israel, France, and Australia, none have been as integrated as the 
relationship between the UK and U.S. militaries. The interaction between their 
militaries has become deeply entrenched within organizational structures, patterns of 
behavior, and even ways of thinking (Rees, 2014). It is the depths of this interaction 
that is overlooked and inadequately understood. 
 
Within the literature on Anglo-American relations, the political relationship between 
heads of state has been the overwhelming focus of attention. Sceptics of its 
"specialness," such as Danchev (1997), have argued that interest has been at its 
source and that without this ingredient the intimacy quickly disappears. Others have 
been more sympathetic to the role played by shared values. They have argued that 
such things as common culture, shared outlooks and language have formed ties of 
sentiment that have helped the two countries to weather periods of strain and 
disagreement (Dobson, 1995; Dumbrell, 2001).   
 
The military relationship has tended to be under-explored, receiving 
acknowledgement only as a carry-over from the shared Cold War peril of confronting 
the Soviet Union. Where the military dimension has received attention, it has tended 
to center on the historical dimensions of the nuclear relationship and the restoration of 
nuclear sharing after 1958 (Clark, 1994; Melissen, 1993; Simpson, 1986). An 
exception to this is Baylis’ (1984) significant study of Anglo-American defense 
issues, but it concluded its analysis just after the Falklands War in 1984. More recent 
scholarship of the military linkages has concentrated on the case studies of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, unsurprising since these campaigns dominated attention at the time 
(Wither, 2006; Baylis & Wirtz, 2012; Marsh, 2013; Clarke, 2014; Mumford 2017). 
Yet, to gain a better understanding of the depths and complexities of the military 
relationship we need delve into its internal mechanics rather than just its outward 
performance. While some studies have provided helpful insights into the level of 
cooperation between the two armed forces (Marsh, 2013; Clarke, 2014), the 
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relationship is under-theorized and little analysis has been devoted to how their 
interactions produce cooperation. This article seeks to fill that gap and by so doing 
contribute to an understanding how the military relationship has proved so durable.  
 
Since the early 1990s the subject of military integration has received considerable 
scholarly attention. To explain the formation of shared norms and expertise across 
state boundaries, scholars have highlighted the role of epistemic communities, "who 
persuade others of their shared causal beliefs and policy goals by virtue of their 
professional knowledge" (Cross, 2013a, p. 142; Cross, 2013b; Haas, 1992, p. 3). 
According to this literature, security and defense integration in Europe has hinged 
upon the agency and interaction of networks of high-ranking security officials who 
have contributed to the facilitation of transnational cohesion in doctrine, strategy and 
military culture (Cross, 2013a, pp. 155-156). Other scholars have turned to the 
literature on strategic culture and in particular the role of norms to explain military 
cooperation and integration (Meyer, 2005; Rynning, 2003; Howorth, 2002). Placing 
norms at the center of the analysis, this literature shares similar assumptions with 
epistemic communities and emphasizes how norms and beliefs help to cultivate and 
shape common national security and defense cultures. Yet, while these approaches 
have made significant inroads into the theorization of military and security 
integration, they do not adequately explain the complexities and intricacies of 
integration beyond the narrow confines of networks of elite practitioners; nor do they 
provide frameworks that clearly identify and elucidate the durability of organizational 
structures and the resilience of patterns of behavior which have underpinned the 
Anglo-American military relationship. 
 
For the purpose of drilling down into the machinery of the partnership, we therefore 
use institutional theory. Research on institutions is premised upon the assumption that 
"all efforts at international cooperation take place within an institutional context of 
some kind" (Keohane, 1988, p. 380). Wallander (2000) acknowledges that alliances 
can be institutions, in that they represent, "persistent, and connected sets of rules that 
prescribe behavioural roles and constrain activity (between countries)" (p. 706). Our 
choice of institutional theory follows from this reasoning and argues that the bilateral 
military relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom has acquired 
institutional characteristics that have become routinized and resilient. It has 
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developed a momentum independent of other aspects of the broader relationship, such 
as trade and diplomacy. The Anglo-American military relationship has been driven 
forward by the British armed forces, despite their position as the junior partner with 
the U.S. military. This theoretical contribution builds upon the work of Xu (2016, pp. 
1210-1211) who utilized historical institutionalism to argue that path dependency had 
led to predictable behavior between the United States and the United Kingdom and 
the creation of mutual trust. We contend that institutionalism can be found in various 
aspects of the Anglo-American security relationship–nuclear, intelligence, homeland 
security–and each has its own characteristics and particular set of cultures, but for the 
purposes of this article we concern ourselves only with the conventional military 
relationship.  
 
The article focuses on the perspective of the UK armed forces in regards to the United 
States. It uses semi-structured interviews with a range of retired and current senior 
officers from all three services of the British armed services. It also draws on 
extensive documentary evidence from sources including Ministry of Defence 
doctrinal statements and speeches, UK foreign affairs and defense committee reports, 
and media articles. It is divided into three sections. The first section introduces the 
theoretical framework developed by Lowndes and Roberts (2013). The second 
section applies this framework to the empirical case study in order to explain the 
resilience of the relationship. The conclusion argues that although British defense 
capabilities may diminish in the future, the objective of its armed forces to partner the 
United States will continue. 
 
 
Institutionalism and the Longevity of Anglo-American Relations 
 
An institution is understood to be devised by individual actors to regularize types of 
activity that are being constantly reproduced and adapted to cope with changing 
circumstances. It serves both to introduce predictability into relationships and provide 
opportunities for action (Keohane, 1988, p. 387), as well as to constrain those 
activities that are judged to be counter-productive. A second feature of institutions is 
that they evolve over time to exhibit formal rules, informal norms, and customs. 
Third, institutions are agents in their own right rather than simply being the sum of 
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their parts. They have legitimacy beyond the preferences of their individual actors 
and may increase this because of their relative stability over time and space 
(Lowndes, 1996, pp. 182-183). 
 
This article argues that the institutional framework developed by Lowndes and 
Roberts (2013) can help to explain the resilience of the Anglo-American relations. 
Their work draws upon a rich heritage of institutionalist approaches including rational 
choice institutionalism (see Peters, 2012; Shepsle, 2006), historical institutionalism 
(see Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2012) and sociological institutionalism (see 
Johnston, 2001; March & Olsen, 2009). Lowndes’ and Roberts’ (2013, pp. 12-13) 
advance the view that a broadly constructivist ontology is required to understand how 
actors behave within institutions. Constructivism assumes that actors can interpret 
their world in different ways. March and Olsen (2009) explain that the "great 
diversity in human motivation and modes of action" is based on "habit, emotion, 
coercion, and calculated expected utility, as well as interpretation of internalized rules 
and principles" (p. 17). Hence, in some scenarios there may be tension between the 
various courses of action the actor attempts to implement resulting in a compromise; 
whereas in others the actor will be able to construct a coherent alignment between 
these courses of action which serve each motivation. The theoretical implications 
gained from this is that actor intent "is not simply defined by a single construction of 
their place in the world, but by a number of different ontological positions which 
create mixed motivations" (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013, p. 13). In this sense, both 
institutions and actors are the result of mixed motivational construction (p. 50). 
 
Constructivists take the view that it is helpful to theorize institutions as working 
through three modes of constraint: formal rules, informal practices (norms), and 
narratives. These are complementary and mutually reinforcing. For example, rules 
often formalize well-established practices whilst narratives are typically used to 
justify the existence of rules. Rules may specify the practices through which they 
must be enacted, and practices usually form the basis of narratives. The case for 
changing the rules often occurs in narrative form, and narratives can present prevalent 
practices in a positive or negative light (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013, p. 53).  
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The first way that institutions constrain actors is through rules that are "formally 
constructed and written down" and are then enacted by coercive action and 
sanctioned by rewards and punishments (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013, pp. 52-53). In a 
rational choice institutionalist perspective, "decision rules" produce an equilibrium in 
political systems by allowing actors to know what they are agreeing to when they 
participate in a "game." Formal rules are also a central dimension of historical 
institutionalism and can include "regulations backed by the force of the law or 
organizational procedure" (Hall & Thelen, 2009, p. 9). Sociological institutionalists 
argue that rules "tell actors where to look for precedents, who are the authoritative 
interpreters of different types of rules, and what the key interpretative traditions are" 
(March & Olsen, 2009, p. 7).  
 
Institutions are also constrained through practices (norms) which are understood as 
being specific to a particular political setting, (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013, p. 62) and 
as such, are influenced but distinct from an actor’s personal values or broader 
cultural/normative tendencies. Accordingly (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013, p. 57), their 
"mode of transmission" is through "demonstration" where "actors understand how 
they are supposed to behave through observing the routinized actions of others and 
seeking to recreate those actions." Practices may reinforce formal rules, but they can 
also be resources of resistance during periods of transition. Informal practices and 
formal rules can complement, accommodate, compete, and substitute with each other 
(Helmke & Levitsky, 2006).  
 
Finally, institutions influence actors through the employment of narratives. This 
position has been developed through the work of Schmidt (2008, 2010) and 
discursive institutionalism. Working alongside rules and practices within institutional 
settings, narratives serve both to empower and constrain actors through resonant 
stories (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013, p. 63). Narratives "provide an account not just of 
how we do things around here, but also why we do things the way we do" (Lowndes 
& Roberts, 2013, p. 64; Schmidt, 2010, p. 3). A narrative can be understood as a 
sequence of actions with a plot that ties together different parts into a "meaningful 
whole" (Feldman, Sköldberg,  Brown, & Horner, 2004). Narratives embody values, 
ideas, and power and are communicated through discourse based on speeches, 
symbols, and style. Forming a branch of sociological institutionalism, discursive 
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approaches toward the understanding of institutions have also been present in rational 
choice and historical institutionalism. Lowndes and Roberts (2013, p. 64) remind us 
that in the former the context for strategic action can be structured by the "organizing 
in" or "organizing out" of certain arguments. In this sense, narratives can possess 
strategic qualities in order to legitimize and persuade (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, & 
Roselle, 2013).  
 
The work of Lowndes and Roberts helps us to understand how the institutional design 
of the U.S.-UK bilateral military relationship comprises the interaction between rules, 
practices, and narratives. It guides the analyst in identifying the multiple, overlapping 
and persistent strands of interaction that have bound the two sides together. This 
collaboration has been in evidence in peacetime, and this has enabled the United 
Kingdom to transition to a warfighting stance alongside the Americans during times 
of conflict. Rules have been based upon formal treaties and shared doctrinal thought. 
This has been accompanied by a thick set of informal norms or practices, which have 
become important "sites" for the exchange of ideas, regular training exercises, and the 
conduct of joint military campaigns and operations. Rules and practices have been 
underpinned by the articulation of narratives that have served to legitimize continued 
cooperation (Schmidt, 2010, p. 18). Due to its size and strength, the US has been the 
dominant "rule maker" (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 942), however, the United 
Kingdom’s enthusiasm has led to it being entrepreneurial within the relationship. The 
next section of the article explores the ways in which the UK armed services have 
nurtured cooperation with their larger ally within this institutionalized military 
relationship. 
 
Anglo-American military relations in war and peace 
 
Formal Rules 
 
As an institution, the Anglo-American military relationship is structured by routinized 
behavior in the form of protocols, regulations, and laws. Rules govern legal 
frameworks, determine patterns of engagement and serve to locate appropriate 
standards of behavior. Military interaction has been formalized in three principal 
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ways which, while separable, in practice interweave with one another. First, their 
bilateral relationship structured by formal written agreements. Second, their 
relationship within the multilateral framework of the North Atlantic Treaty 1949, 
which has acted as a cement and a set of binding rules. The United Kingdom has 
nestled its bilateral contacts with the United States within the Alliance and, by taking 
leadership roles and contributing to operations, it has used NATO to "amplify" its 
intimacy with Washington (UK Government, 2015, p. 14). Third, the development of 
shared military doctrine, understood as "[a] set of prescriptions … specifying how 
military forces should be structured and employed" (Posen, 1984, p. 13). Doctrine has 
grown out of both the NATO and the bilateral context and has resulted in common 
approaches toward the conduct of conflict. Such doctrine, influenced by the use of 
similar equipment and technology, has been crucial in cultivating shared threat 
assessments and approaches to security.    
 
Formal written agreements between the United Kingdom and the United States are 
relatively few in number yet they have played a vital role in providing a legal 
framework for aspects of the relationship that are particularly sensitive and especially 
close. They include the 1947 agreement on intelligence sharing, that divided up 
coverage of the world in signals intelligence; the 1958 Atomic Energy Defence 
Agreement that restored nuclear sharing and the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement that 
allowed for UK purchases of successive generations of U.S. strategic nuclear delivery 
systems. Such documents have specified the basis for the sharing of information and 
provided the inner core to concentric circles of cooperation with other countries, such 
as the Five Eyes intelligence relationship. They have also provided for the 
transference of technologies. When military equipment has become obsolescent, 
rather than these agreements being terminated, they have been adapted to facilitate 
the procurement of American equipment by the United Kingdom. As such they 
represent the landmarks of the formal, bilateral relationship around which much of 
the practical US-UK cooperation has been allowed to develop.    
 
The multilateral framework of NATO has provided a "site" where the exchange of 
ideas and the development of common rules within the Anglo-American relationship 
can occur. The North Atlantic Treaty has promoted a set of common values between 
its members, adherence to the principle of collective defense and commitment to the 
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rule of law, based on the United Nations Charter. This has afforded NATO agency in 
prescribing "logics of appropriateness" (March & Olsen, 2009) and in influencing the 
identities of its members. The Alliance has provided a stable backcloth to the U.S.-
UK bilateral relationship, cementing their shared interests in the security of Europe. It 
has reduced uncertainty over American actions and given the British mechanisms for 
influence over its ally. For example, the UK has held the post of Deputy Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) underneath a U.S. four star general, and has 
capitalized its position as the framework nation for the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. 
The Alliance has also conferred a sense of legitimacy in executing military missions. 
It has preserved the principle of right of first refusal for a military operation over the 
European Union and taken the lead in operations such as the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and in Libya in 2011.  
 
The third component of the rules-based relationship has been the development of 
military doctrine. This has fostered predictability in the expectations, interests, and 
thinking of each partner, providing an important underpinning to the relationship. 
These rules have also been internalized in the identities of the American and British 
militaries and have acted as markers of appropriate behavior influencing the types of 
methods and operations both armed forces have practiced. Although doctrine is not 
formally recognized as binding legal commitments, they are the closest representation 
of formal rules that exist outside of NATO. Within the Alliance, national defense 
doctrines have been brought together to ensure their compatibility with the United 
States as the lead nation (NATO Standardization Office, 2010). This has facilitated 
the sort of psychological integration that enables the UK to transition alongside the 
United States from peacetime to a warfighting stance (Interview, 2012a).  
 
The challenge for the United Kingdom of trying to be able to conduct operations 
alongside the United States should not be under-estimated: After all, the American 
military are significantly larger and more technologically advanced (British Army, 
2009, p. 7). The test of trying to sustain this was summed up by the former Chief of 
the Air Staff, Jock Stirrup (2004):  
 
Keeping up with the Americans presupposes that the Americans know where 
they are going and we just follow on a little bit behind. Actually, that is not 
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good enough and we need to be there at the same time as they do, so we have 
to try to predict where they are going to wind up so that we are in a position at 
that moment in time to be interoperable  
 
This has necessitated the British military making considerable efforts, both nationally 
and within NATO, to emulate the broad shifts in U.S. doctrine. It has required the 
United Kingdom to purchase particular types of weapons system that ensure the 
capacity to operate with U.S. forces. In periods of conflict it has sometimes led to the 
United States providing the United Kingdom with equipment or access to 
communications and intelligence systems in order for the British to keep up. The 
result of trying to act alongside their ally has been that the United Kingdom has often 
found itself over-stretched, attempting to preserve the sort of full spectrum military 
capabilities only at the disposal of a superpower (Edelman, 2009).  
 
The United States pioneered the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW), defined 
as the integration of military forces with digital technology in order "to achieve 
shared awareness, increased speed of command, a high tempo of operations, greater 
lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization" (Freedman, 
2006; Dorman, 2008, p. v). The British military recognized that it needed appropriate 
technologies for networked capabilities in order to be able to work with U.S. forces 
(Farrell, 2008, p. 786; UK Government, 2015). This has been reflected in the 
purchase of U.S. weapons platforms, such as the F35 advanced combat aircraft. The 
British military has promoted integration and synchronicity across and between the 
land, maritime and air components of its armed forces (Ministry of Defence, 2013, 
pp. 3-9; Ministry of Defence, 2017a, p. 63; Ministry of Defence, 2017b, pp. 3-8).  
However, due to resource constraints and differences in aspects of military culture, 
the UK armed forces developed their own, cheaper model of Network Enabled 
Capability (NEC) (Clarke, 2014, p. 5). According to Farrell (2008), the United 
Kingdom has "adapted (American ideas) to suit British circumstances and 
sensibilities" (p. 805). While it saw networking as an enabler of victory, the British 
military still believed that operational success depended on "the pre-eminent role of 
Command as well as the moral, physical and intellectual components of Fighting 
Power" (Clarke, 2014, p. 5).  
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The United Kingdom also adapted the U.S. concept of Effects Based Operations 
(EBO) to its own needs. Unlike the Americans who believed that EBO signaled 
profound changes to the nature of military operations, the British saw it only as a 
change of approach to operations (Farrell, 2008, p. 793). The EBO prioritized two 
aspects: first, non-material objectives in operations, such as achieving a durable peace 
and good governance. For example, the RAF has been less wedded than its American 
counterparts to the use of overwhelming firepower (Royal Air Force, 1999). Second, 
the United Kingdom has set greater store on a multi-agency approach to operations. 
Subsequently, both sides stopped referring to EBO explicitly (Clarke, 2014, p. 5; 
Mattis, 2008, p. 19), but its influence on their thinking was still discernible. U.S. and 
UK defense planners still understand the need to generate kinetic and non-kinetic 
effects in operations. For instance, the principles of action and effect and the use of 
integrated forces remain a core feature of British and U.S. Army doctrinal thinking. 
The U.S. Army’s recently released "FM 3-0 Operations" is punctuated with 
references to effects-based thinking, which the British Army has emulated (United 
States Army, 2017).  
 
It is evident from this analysis that rules have played an important part in the 
resilience and stability of the Anglo-American military relationship, from formal 
agreements through to multilaterally and bilaterally derived doctrine. The U.S. armed 
forces have been the lead designers of these rules and the British have acted largely as 
a rule-taker. Nevertheless, the relationship between rule taker and rule maker is a 
dynamic one and the British have been able to exercise entrepreneurship at various 
points in the process (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 942). Despite being the junior partner, 
the UK’s intimacy with U.S. planning has enabled its military to anticipate the 
trajectory of U.S. strategic policy, even if this has imposed significant burdens on the 
capabilities of its forces. 
 
Informal practices 
 
The Anglo-American military relationship has displayed the institutional qualities of 
informal practices. These accompany formal rules but develop into the custom and 
practice through which rules are interpreted and operationalized. Their transmission is 
through demonstration where actors observe the routinized actions of others and 
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replicate them, helping to define how things should be done and determine 
"legitimate means to pursue valued ends" (Scott, 2008, p. 55). In the words of King 
(2011), "there is an inevitable gap between doctrine and stated practice" (p. 9). 
Practice becomes a source of influence on the behavior of actors and may act as a 
mode of constraint (Pouliot, 2010). The relationship between formal rules and 
practices is a complicated one: Practices can complement, accommodate, compete 
and even come to substitute for rules. In the Anglo-American military relationship, 
the synergy between rules and practices across organizations, doctrine, and 
technological capability has displayed at least one of these conditions making the 
interplay of cooperation complicated and fluid. In our analysis we draw a distinction 
between practices in peacetime and in wartime, noting that the former help to smooth 
the transition to the latter. 
 
During peacetime interaction across a variety of levels take place between the UK 
and U.S. militaries. This amounts to what one commentator has described as a "deep 
infrastructure for consultation and cooperation" (Niblett, 2007, p. 627) and others 
have termed, "the myriad bilateral committees, working groups and liaison officers" 
(Baylis & Wirtz, 2012, p. 253). One level is between the UK Ministry of Defence and 
the Pentagon, that percolates down through the entire British defense establishment. 
The British Defence Staff in Washington act as the umbrella for approximately 750 
civilian and military personnel scattered throughout the United States. The most 
important are those officers who sit within the major U.S. commands including 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Strategic Command (STRATCOM), Cyber 
Command (CYBERCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM) (Interview, 2014b). 
Some are senior military advisers, others are embedded within the U.S. military chain 
of command and perform roles that would normally be carried out by American 
personnel. The largest contingent of around 50 staff, under a two-star general, reside 
in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida which manages 
operations for the Middle East and Central Asia. In addition, since March 2013, the 
UK Chiefs of Staff have conducted their own face to face dialogue with the U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), reviving a forum that dates back to the Second World War (UK 
Government, 2013). The UK Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) has a small staff 
within the Pentagon to maintain his contacts with the Chairman.  
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In turn, each of the three UK armed services complements this strategic interaction 
with their own inter-service relationship.  The heads of the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force maintain frequent contact, and have their representatives on the staff of their 
opposite numbers in the US (Interview, 2014c). The U.S. military is a large and 
diverse organization and over time the relative intimacy of these relationships have 
waxed and waned. The interaction between the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy, for 
example, has been close since the time of the Cold War when the British were 
providing anti-submarine warfare capabilities in the eastern Atlantic. Although their 
navies have performed only limited roles in recent overseas campaigns, the ties 
between them remain strong. The UK’s possession of hunter killer and ballistic 
missile submarines provides rare and important synergies between the two navies; not 
least the chance to train together and compare themselves with each other. The new 
Queen Elizabeth-class of aircraft carrier will accord the Royal Navy a force 
projection capability that the United States will take seriously (Zambellas, 2015) and 
is being mooted to backfill American assets when the US is engaged in combat 
missions. It is illustrative of their familiarity that a Royal Navy officer was located at 
the US naval base in Norfolk, Virginia to re-learn the lessons of large carrier 
operations and American Marine F-35s will be some of the first aircraft to operate 
from the new vessels from 2020.   
 
The relationship between the Royal Air Force (RAF) and their American counterparts 
has been less intimate. The RAF has been forced to work hard to develop a close 
relationship with such a technologically advanced air force. It has been facilitated by 
America’s presence at airbases in the United Kingdom; by joint training exercises, 
such as Red Flag in the Nevada desert, and by the presence of British officers in the 
U.S. Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Qatar (Interview, 2014a) that 
conducts activities in the Middle East and Central Asia. The RAF has also built 
synergies with the United States over unmanned aerial vehicles through operations 
from its Waddington facility and Creech Air Force Base in Nevada.  
 
As for the British Army, its relationship with the U.S. Army was traditionally weak 
because the two countries defended separate stretches of the Central Front in West 
Germany during the Cold War. Ironically, this distant relationship has been 
transformed by the experience of interventionist operations in the Balkans, Iraq and 
17 
Afghanistan. Not only have these interventions required planning and collaboration, 
but subsequent efforts to stabilize the countries have necessitated protracted 
engagement. In the case of the Balkans, UK and American ground forces had to 
develop new concepts of peace enforcement, whilst in Afghanistan and Iraq they have 
wrestled with post-conflict stabilization, reconstruction, and complex counter-
insurgency (COIN) campaigns.   
 
The breadth and depth of peacetime interactions, in training, exercising and the usage 
of American equipment, has provided the basis for British units to transition 
alongside the United States to the use of force. Whether conducted under the banner 
of NATO or through ad hoc coalitions, the UK-U.S. bilateral relationship has formed 
the nucleus of Western warfighting operations. The advantages of working alongside 
the Americans have been apparent to the British armed services: The United States 
has been at the heart of the decision-making; it has possessed the strength to shape the 
battle-space and minimize casualties; it has provided satellite and digital 
communications and furnished critical "enablers" such as precision guided munitions. 
The United Kingdom has been able to draw upon its familiarity with American 
equipment, its knowledge of U.S. operational doctrine and its experience of training 
with their forces. For example, the RAF’s experience in policing the No-Fly-Zone 
(NFZ) over Iraq between 1991-98 made it easier to conduct offensive air operations 
when war was initiated in 2003 (Clarke, 2014, p. 232). Similarly, when naval 
operations were begun by the U.S. Fifth Fleet against Iraq in 2003, the British were 
able to draw upon the experience of operating with them in the Persian Gulf since the 
time of the Armilla Patrol.  
 
The British have engaged in a regular practice of "plugging into" U.S. operational 
structures, such as a British armored division in the first Gulf War. By virtue of the 
size of the UK commitment, it has derived the right to be treated as second in 
command. The initial British contribution in Afghanistan was in Special Forces but 
by the time of the formation of ISAF, it was contributing 10 000 personnel, the 
largest after the United States. In the 2003 War against Iraq, the United Kingdom 
contributed an armored division, believing that this was the size necessary to obtain 
full consultation with Washington. This resulted in being granted their own zone of 
responsibility, Multi-National Division South East, headquartered in Basra. Three star 
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British officers were appointed deputies to U.S. theatre commanders and British 
military personnel were present in the Strategic Planning Staffs of General Casey in 
Iraq and in General Petraeus’ headquarters in Afghanistan (Interview, 2015a).   
 
By being in situ with U.S. theatre commanders, the United Kingdom was present 
during American decision-making and in a position to exert influence over the 
conduct of the politico-military campaigns. Even at tactical levels, British military 
units have been embedded in U.S. command structures.1 An example of this was the 
role played by British Special Forces under Joint Special Operations Command 
(JSOC), led by Lt General Stanley McChrystal in Baghdad (Urban, 2011). The 
British were able to play a significant role in the so-called "Anbar Awakening" in Iraq 
after 2007, starting contacts with some of the Sunni tribes, that had become 
disillusioned with the atrocities of Al-Qaeda, and turning them against the insurgency 
(Interview, 2015b).   
 
Even more important than the overall size of the British contribution has been their 
quality and intent. A common phrase amongst British officers serving with the United 
States has been: "it’s the chemistry not the physics" (Interview, 2014b). The United 
Kingdom has offset its limited size by sending some of its brightest and most capable 
personnel to U.S. military academies and then to liaison and embedded roles within 
the American armed forces. By fielding individuals of high caliber the United 
Kingdom has sought to wield influence within the U.S. system. Not only do these 
individuals gain insight and experience into U.S. military practices, but they reflect a 
positive image of the UK armed forces. Because they stand outside the U.S. military’s 
own chain of command, British officers have been able to offer an alternative, 
sometimes discordant view, that has challenged the prevailing orthodoxy. Numerous 
British officers, during interviews, expressed the view that they had enjoyed 
disproportionate influence during their time embedded within a U.S. military unit. 
Most recently, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have left a whole generation of 
officers with experiences of close interaction with U.S. forces. Comradeship formed 
                                           
 1 During the Coalition’s assault on Iraq’s Al Faw Peninsular a U.S. Marine unit was actually 
placed under the command of UK 3 Commando Brigade, illustrating reciprocity in command 
relationships (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2017).  
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at an early stage in an individual’s career can be drawn upon when officers arrive in 
positions of command. Military campaigns provide a crucible in which deep personal 
bonds can transcend formal rule structures.   
 
As far as intent has been concerned, the United Kingdom has been beside the United 
States, taking the full range of risks from the outset of conflicts. The British have 
aimed to provide a small but highly effective and professional capability and impose 
no limitations, or "red cards," upon their involvement. Former Chief of the General 
Staff, Sir Richard Dannatt, noted in relation to the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan: 
"credibility with the US is earned by being an ally that can be relied on to state clearly 
what it will do and then does it effectively" (Sengupta, 2009). For example, the 
United Kingdom spearheaded the operation into Helmand in 2006. In the eyes of 
critics this was motivated partly by the desire of the British Army to be seen to 
partner their ally: Even at the risk of failing to warn their own government about the 
risks of over-commitment (Clarke, 2014, p. 241).   
 
In addition, although the UK contribution may be small and less technologically 
sophisticated, it can be used in ways that makes it especially valuable to the United 
States. The British have been willing to take risks from which their U.S. counterparts 
have demurred. For instance, the Royal Navy has integrated itself into U.S. submarine 
intelligence gathering efforts, both during and after the Cold War, based on their 
capacity to obtain information unavailable to their ally (Ring, 2001). Whether in 
relation to targets in Russia, China or off the coast of East Africa, Royal Navy vessels 
have secured unique intelligence that the US considered unobtainable. This has 
helped to justify the "hugely privileged access" to intelligence and advanced 
equipment (Interview, 2012b) that the United Kingdom has received from the United 
States in return (Interview, 2015a).  
 
The synergy between doctrinal rules and practices has been a dynamic process. 
Whilst doctrine in relation to air and naval forces has been relatively stable, land 
force doctrine has undergone considerable volatility. This has resulted from 
engagement in low-intensity operations, such as COIN and post-conflict stabilization. 
During the insurgencies across Iraq and Afghanistan, the Anglo-American military 
response developed at different speeds, which caused tension between their armed 
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forces. The British Army saw itself as the expert in these types of operations based on 
its experience of low intensity warfare in its former colonies and in Northern Ireland 
(British Army, 2009, pp. 4-5). Nevertheless, the United States invested heavily in the 
development of a COIN doctrine: General David Petraeus led a team at Fort 
Leavenworth in 2005 and its thinking swiftly overtook British ideas and practices 
(Interview, 2014d). A report for the UK CGS bluntly recognized "Although the US 
Army came from an even weaker corporate understanding, it learned on the job faster 
than we did" (British Army, 2009: 4). Mumford (2017) notes that although the U.S.-
UK relationship has "waxed fat on war," it has "waned" in relation to counter-
insurgency (p. 31).    
 
This section has demonstrated that the UK military has sought to cultivate 
cooperation with their American counterparts, across all the services as well as at an 
individual level. Practices in wartime have been adapted from the experiences of 
working and training together during peacetime. The United Kingdom has been 
focused upon what it can offer the United States, in the belief that cooperation will 
disproportionately benefit the British armed services.  
 
 
Narratives  
 
Whilst rules and practices help to explain the substance of Anglo-American military 
cooperation, narratives account for its legitimation. According to March and Olsen 
(2009), there is the need for "structures of meaning that explain and justify 
behaviour" (p. 5). Narratives serve as the "symbolic architecture of institutions" and 
comprise a meta-narrative, articulated through stories that provide specific 
contextualized examples (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013, p. 63). The UK military has 
extolled a meta-narrative of its relationship of intimacy and strength with the United 
States, during times of both peace and war. In peacetime, the British use the language 
of "specialness" to persuade the United States of their importance: in wartime, they 
have portrayed themselves as America’s "partner of choice," one that is willing to pay 
a blood price. This behavior is contrasted with other U.S. allies who are reluctant to 
subject their personnel to danger.  
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The shared history between the two sides began with the Second World War which 
marked a titanic struggle against Fascism. It was followed by the Cold War era that 
cemented their cooperation through the upholding of a western conception of political 
and economic order based on democratic government, free markets and adherence to 
the rule of law. In the eyes of critics, shared values have been superficial and the 
relationship has been based on fabrications that have created an artificial sense of 
shared endeavor (Danchev, 2005, p. 434). Throughout this time the UK military have 
acted as a source of institutional memory regarding the depth and breadth of 
transatlantic cooperation.  
 
The United Kingdom has positioned itself as an intermediary between the United 
States and Europe. As a consistent supporter of the right of first refusal for NATO in 
interventions, the United Kingdom has been able to block attempts to challenge 
American leadership on the continent. The United Kingdom has always supported 
U.S. primacy: It has even held back from exploiting its own bilateral relationship with 
countries, such as France, in deference to its investment in working with the United 
States.  It was made clear to Washington that the UK’s membership and leading role 
within NATO was a bulwark against greater European autonomy in defense. Indeed 
throughout the post-Cold War period, the United Kingdom has remained opposed to a 
closer defense framework being developed through the European Union. One of the 
ironies of Brexit is that the value of the United Kingdom to America will diminish 
because it will no longer be able to act as a bridge between the United States and 
Europe (Rees, 2017, p. 565). 
 
The British military have consistently reminded their U.S. partners of their shared 
sense of global responsibilities. Former Defence Secretary Michael Fallon (2016) 
described the United Kingdom as pursuing a "defence that is international by design." 
The armed services have emphasized the fact that they think, plan and take action in 
concert with the United States. This has found resonance with the American military: 
The Chairman of the JCS, Martin Dempsey acknowledged that, "We share a 
remarkably close relationship … as militaries. It’s one founded on our history, our 
values and genuine friendship" (as cited in Wiesgerber, 2014). 
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The meta-narrative during wartime has been calibrated according to the changing 
post-Cold War security environment: humanitarian interventions, peace enforcement, 
and the War on Terrorism. Britain has placed emphasis on reassuring the US that they 
will not "let them down" in a crisis. Resonant stories talk of the two sides fighting 
side-by-side with "comrades in arms" (Richards, 2013). Such language has been 
designed by the United Kingdom to bind itself to its ally, founded upon mutual 
affection and respect. The British have translated this narrative into practical 
commitments, seeking to guarantee to their U.S. counterparts that they have the 
capability and political will to operate beside them in the most demanding of 
circumstances. This desire is exemplified in the comment of one of Britain’s senior 
officers in Iraq, Brigadier Justin Maciejewski in 2006, "The first and over-riding 
factor shaping the British campaign in Iraq … (was the) obsession with British-US 
security relations" (as cited in Mumford, 2017, p. 170).   
 
Yet narratives can differ between the two sides. As the weaker partner, it has been in 
the British interest to laud the virtues of their intimacy with the United States. The 
British have been careful only to criticize the United States in private, for fear of 
damaging the relationship. In contrast, the United States, with less to lose, has not 
practiced the same level of restraint in its criticism of the United Kingdom. For 
example, the United States castigated the UK’s lack of contribution in three major 
situations: first, the "surge" in Iraq where President Bush sent in large-scale 
reinforcements; second, the "Charge of the Knights" episode where British forces 
were perceived to capitulate to the Shia militias by withdrawing from Basra city to 
the airport; and finally, the withdrawal of British forces from key bases, such as 
Sangin, in Helmand Province (Interview, 2014e. Such events also had practical 
consequences, as demonstrated by the withdrawal of British CENTCOM planners 
from involvement over Syria when the British Parliament voted against retaliation 
over President Assad’s use of chemical weapons (‘“Unreliable’ British officers," 
2013). In many of these cases the criticism from the U.S. side was unjustified. In 
Helmand, American forces quickly realized that the limited UK force had faced a 
formidable enemy (Farrell, 2017, p. 358), whilst in Iraq, British forces lacked 
resources and political backing from Downing Street (Porter, 2010, p. 369).   
  
23 
This section has discussed how the United Kingdom has fostered narratives that 
proclaimed a special military relationship. The discourse has helped to produce and 
shape a pattern of behavior asserting the United Kingdom as America’s closest ally. 
These stories have contributed to the legitimation of resilient forms of institutional 
behavior between the two militaries, to the satisfaction of the British side.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has argued that theories of institutionalism provide vital insights into 
explaining the durability of the Anglo-American military relationship. Institutional 
characteristics have become routinized between the two sides. They have been 
nurtured from the British side through formal agreements, by the adaptation of U.S. 
doctrine, by embedding personnel in American military structures and by weaving 
narratives that extol joint action. The UK armed forces have been adept at using these 
various forms of interaction to cultivate close cooperation with the American military. 
Collaboration nurtured in peacetime has enabled the British military to be able to 
transition to periods of conflict beside its ally. Cooperation has been courted by all 
levels of the UK armed forces, fostering what Williams and Schaub describe as "a 
congruence of outlook" with America (as cited in Dumbrell, 2001, p. 8). It has been 
seen to confer prestige, access to enhanced capabilities and a voice in some of 
America’s decisions. This military relationship has contributed to the longevity of the 
broader Anglo-American relationship. 
 
The article has sought to make a number of contributions to the existing literature. 
First, by using elite interviews and documentary analysis it has offered a close 
empirical inspection of the neglected conventional military relationship, the unseen 
institutional "ballast" of the US-UK special relationship. Second, by applying 
Lowndes and Roberts’ (2013) framework of institutional rules, informal practices and 
narratives, it has helped to capture and explain the richness and complexity of Anglo-
American military interaction. By acknowledging that institutions derive from actors 
with mixed motivations, it has explored how the US-UK military relationship has 
been shaped by rationalist incentives, historical paths, and cultural and discursive 
frames. 
24 
 
Conceptualizing UK-US military cooperation using this reading of institutionalism 
has facilitated an analysis that elucidates some of the subtleties of the relationship: its 
overt forms as well as its more abstract and intangible manifestations. It might have 
been expected that a military relationship would be precisely demarcated, reflecting 
the gravity of the issues involved. Yet in reality, as cooperation has matured over 
time, rules have been stretched and bent to accommodate the vicissitudes of the 
relationship. This process has been exacerbated by engagement in military conflicts 
that have punctuated the habitual patterns of peacetime collaboration. The demands of 
wartime have required ways of working together to be adapted to fit new operational 
tasks and legitimated through revised narratives.   
 
The future intimacy of the relationship is uncertain, fueled by the America-first 
policies of the Trump administration. It is likely to face changes caused by the 
inability of the United Kingdom to fund military capabilities that preserve its status in 
the eyes of the United States. Damage was done by the over-extension of British 
forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Senior figures have supported this prediction: Former 
US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, noted that "it will be increasingly difficult for 
them [the UK] to be a full spectrum partner (of the US)" (as cited in Wintour, 2014). 
Even senior British military officers have opined that defense cuts have undermined 
the country’s position as America’s natural ally. For example, General Sir Nick 
Houghton warned that cuts to the British Army had resulted in the creation of a 
"hollow force" (as cited in "Shoulder Pips Squeaking," 2017, p. 28), while General 
Sir Richard Barrons warned of Britain becoming "Belgium with nukes" (as cited in 
Haynes, 2018, p. 4).  
 
It is quite plausible that the United Kingdom will be less militarily capable in future. 
But it is the contention of this article that this will not alter the desire of the UK’s 
military to cooperate as closely as possible with the United States. The British 
military exist within a framework that sets a premium on being aligned with their 
American counterparts. This institutional mindset cannot easily be undone as it has 
resulted from the United Kingdom being immersed in America’s strategic thinking. 
The UK views the world through a lens that has been conditioned by close interaction 
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with its larger ally and it shares much of America’s assumptions and threat 
assessments. 
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